Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
August 2013, Volume 20, Issue 4, pp 806-811

Gordon Pennycook, James Allan Cheyne, Derek J. Koehler, Jonathan A. Fugelsang

Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada

Abstract

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.

http://link.springer.com/article/10.3758%2Fs13423-013-0394-3

Describing the relationship between cat bites and human depression using data from an electronic health record

PLoS One. 2013 Aug 1;8(8):e70585
Published: August 01, 2013
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070585

David A. Hanauer [1], Naren Ramakrishnan [2], and Lisa S. Seyfried [3]

[1] Department of Pediatrics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
[2] Department of Computer Science, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia, United States of America
[3] Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States of America
University of Rennes 1, France

Abstract

Data mining approaches have been increasingly applied to the electronic health record and have led to the discovery of numerous clinical associations. Recent data mining studies have suggested a potential association between cat bites and human depression. To explore this possible association in more detail we first used administrative diagnosis codes to identify patients with either depression or bites, drawn from a population of 1.3 million patients. We then conducted a manual chart review in the electronic health record of all patients with a code for a bite to accurately determine which were from cats or dogs. Overall there were 750 patients with cat bites, 1,108 with dog bites, and approximately 117,000 patients with depression. Depression was found in 41.3% of patients with cat bites and 28.7% of those with dog bites. Furthermore, 85.5% of those with both cat bites and depression were women, compared to 64.5% of those with dog bites and depression. The probability of a woman being diagnosed with depression at some point in her life if she presented to our health system with a cat bite was 47.0%, compared to 24.2% of men presenting with a similar bite. The high proportion of depression in patients who had cat bites, especially among women, suggests that screening for depression could be appropriate in patients who present to a clinical provider with a cat bite. Additionally, while no causative link is known to explain this association, there is growing evidence to suggest that the relationship between cats and human mental illness, such as depression, warrants further investigation.

http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0070585

The separate roles of the reflective mind and involuntary inhibitory control in gatekeeping paranormal beliefs and the underlying intuitive confusions

British Journal of Psychology
Volume 104, Issue 3, pages 303–319, August 2013
DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2012.02118.x

Annika M. Svedholm and Marjaana Lindeman

Institute of Behavioural Sciences, Division of Cognitive Psychology and Neuropsychology, University of Helsinki, Finland

Intuitive thinking is known to predict paranormal beliefs, but the processes underlying this relationship, and the role of other thinking dispositions, have remained unclear. Study 1 showed that while an intuitive style increased and a reflective disposition counteracted paranormal beliefs, the ontological confusions suggested to underlie paranormal beliefs were predicted by individual differences in involuntary inhibitory processes. When the reasoning system was subjected to cognitive load, the ontological confusions increased, lost their relationship with paranormal beliefs, and their relationship with weaker inhibition was strongly accentuated. These findings support the argument that the confusions are mainly intuitive and that they therefore are most discernible under conditions in which inhibition is impaired, that is, when thinking is dominated by intuitive processing. Study 2 replicated the findings on intuitive and reflective thinking and paranormal beliefs. In Study 2, ontological confusions were also related to the same thinking styles as paranormal beliefs. The results support a model in which both intuitive and non-reflective thinking styles and involuntary inhibitory processes give way to embracing culturally acquired paranormal beliefs.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2044-8295.2012.02118.x/abstract

Eating dogfood: Examining the relative roles of reason and emotion

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Volume 92, August 2013, Pages 202–213
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.06.004

William Schulze [a], Annemie Maertens [b], Brian Wansink [c]

[a] Kenneth L. Robinson Professor of Agricultural Economics at Cornell University, United States
[b] Posvar Hall 3204, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, United States
[c] John Dyson Professor of Consumer Behavior at Cornell University, United States

Highlights

• We study stigma in a laboratory setting by eliciting willingness-to-pay from participants for a chicken sandwich and ice cream.
• We provide information about the sandwich (healthy ingredients, but made for dogs) and ice cream (artificial ingredients, but fat free).
• We put a subset of the participants under cognitive load.
• The order in which the information is provided matters and participants who are not under cognitive load deliberate the health benefits.
• These results point to an underlying dual process model.

Abstract

Psychologists have described the working of the human brain as a combination of two systems – a dual process model. One system is intuitive and automatic (System 1) and the other is reflective and rational (System 2). To determine what insights this model has for stigma – such as fears of food contamination – we elicited the willingness-to-pay for two foods: a sandwich made of dog food and fat-free ice cream. We find critical evidence of a dual process decision making process in which the absence of cognitive load allows the participants to deliberate over the health benefits of either food. In addition, in the case of the sandwich, there is an emotional component in which the positive emotion of surprise can partially offset the negative emotion of disgust. This has notable implications for addressing food safety fears related to contamination as well as the food neophobia related to unfamiliar foods, processing, or preparation.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726811300156X